

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman

1. Please note penciled comments throughout the attached memo.

2. In addition to the penciled comments, I have prepared a substitute paragraph 4.

Attachment:
As stated

Date 5 May 1978

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
2 MAY 1978

Executive Registry

78-5467

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:



SUBJECT:

DCI-DoD Agreement on NITC Pentagon Operations

1. Attached for your review is a draft Memorandum of Agreement intended to cover the operations and support of the NITC warning and crisis management element operating in the Pentagon with the CCF. The key paragraphs for your consideration are 2-4, 5 and 8; the remainder deal with nuts and bolts. In paragraph 8, we are stating the requirement for JCS to advise you concerning military operations options under consideration.

obviously an opening paragraph that will require many iterations.

2. One of my people is now discussing our objectives and support requirements with DIA on a low key, informal basis. If you find the attached draft satisfactory, I will undertake to negotiate it with Dan Murphy, also on an informal basis in order to avoid exciting Congressional sensitivities at this time.



Attachment:

Memorandum of Agreement (Draft)

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: DCI-DoD Agreement on NITC Pentagon Operations

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(2 May 78)

REVISED DRAFT: 4/28/78

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

PREAMBLE

1. This memorandum of agreement addresses the mission, functions, and operational support of the warning and crisis management element of the National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC). This element will be based in the Pentagon and will utilize facilities and support services provided by the Department of Defense as specified below. When appropriate, however, it may shift the focus of its operations to the facilities of other Intelligence Community agencies for the duration of a particular warning or crisis situation.

AGREEMENT OBJECTIVES

2. The purpose of this agreement is to establish and maintain operational procedures and mechanisms for assuring effective and efficient use of all source intelligence collection, processing and dissemination national intelligence production and the resources in support of National decisionmaking and command authorities with respect to:

- a. warning of foreign activities and intentions inimical to U.S. security or interests which could require the alerting and deployment of U.S. military forces;
- b. management of international crises involving the potential or actual employment of major U.S. military forces in a contingency or combat role;
- c. warning and crisis management situations other than the above, requiring DCI support of the President and the Special

Coordinating Committee;

Substitute Paragraph 4

4. The concept for the operation of the warning and crisis management element is derived from Subsection 1-502 of EO 12036. The staff element, with respect to the warning and crisis management context in the preceding section, will:

- a. translate National foreign intelligence requirements and priorities developed by DCI authority into specific collection objectives and targets for the Intelligence Community;

- b. assignment of targets and objectives to collection organizations and systems through established collection system management mechanisms;

- c. assurance of timely processing and dissemination of intelligence collected;

- d. provide advisory tasking of non-NFIP departments and agencies which have information collection capabilities or intelligence assets;

- e. establish and maintain facilities and procedures for rapid and efficient augmentation of the elements's staff and operations during periods of rising international tension and crisis management;

- f. conduct periodic training exercises for NITC personnel, in conjunction with appropriate Intelligence Community, agencies and operational and policy staffs, to assure operations in periods of tension and crisis;

g. participate with Intelligence Community agencies and operational and policy staffs in the development and implementation of systems and procedures, intended to enhance the effective use of National intelligence collection resources for indications and warning and crisis management purposes, such as the Warning Improvement Study and Plan (WISP);

h. participate, with appropriate DoD elements, in development and periodic exercise of procedures to effect orderly transfer to DoD, as provided for in Subsection 1-504 of Executive Order 12036.

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d. support of the tactical information needs of U.S. military forces deployed in response to international crisis management requirements; and

e. advisory tasking of appropriate Department of Defense resources by the DCI as necessary to discharge his responsibilities as principal intelligence advisor to the President and the Special Coordinating Committee.

NITC ELEMENT-FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The NITC warning and crisis management element will consist of a small permanent staff headed by a National Intelligence Tasking Officer (NITO). The element will be staffed and operated by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Pre-established procedures and periodic exercises, will provide for rapid and flexible DCI augmentation of staff resources in response to developing warning and crisis management situations.

4. The NITO and his staff will perform the following specific functions with respect to the operational warning and crisis management contexts described in the preceding section:

a. discharge, as immediate representative of the Director, National Intelligence Tasking Center, the responsibilities set forth in Subsection 1-502 of Executive Order 12036 to include:

*delete
see sub
para 4*

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- see substitute
para 4*
- (1) translation of national foreign intelligence requirements into specific collection objectives and targets;
 - (2) assignment of targets and objectives to collection organizations and systems through established collection system management mechanisms;
 - (3) assurance of timely processing and dissemination of intelligence collected;
 - (4) advisory tasking of non-NFIP departments and agencies which have information collection capabilities or intelligence assets;

- delete:
internal to ETS*
- b. develop and coordinate, in conjunction with other elements of the NITC, implementation of multidisciplinary collection plans designed to optimize intelligence collection coverage;
 - c. provide timely support to the DCI concerning the status, capabilities, tasking and information yield of applicable intelligence collection resources;
 - ~~c. d.~~ establish and maintain facilities and procedures for rapid and efficient augmentation of the element's staff and operations during periods of rising international tension and crisis management;
 - ~~g. e.~~ conduct periodic training exercises for NITC personnel, in conjunction with DIA and appropriate Intelligence Community, agencies and operational and policy staffs, to assure operations in periods of tension and crisis;
 - ~~g. f.~~ participate with Intelligence Community agencies and operational and policy staffs in the development and implementation

of systems and procedures, intended to enhance the effective use of National intelligence collection resources for indications and warning and crisis management purposes, such as the Warning Improvement Study and Plan (WISP);

h. g. participate, with appropriate DoD elements, in development and periodic exercise of procedures to effect orderly transfer to DoD, as provided for in Subsection 1-504 of Executive Order 12036.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

5. To insure effective operational interaction and efficient use of personnel resources, the NITC warning and crisis management element will be ~~directly supported~~ by the ^{DIA} ~~present~~ Collection Coordination Facility (CCF). ~~operated by DIA as a joint DoD-DCI entity. As a result the DCI or his designate will file a concurrent performance rating on the Chief of that Facility.~~ To the maximum feasible extent, the two organizations will develop common procedures, information displays and reporting vehicles. ~~for use in providing support to the DCI, the JCS and senior DoD authorities in warning and crisis management situations.~~

6. DIA will provide the NITO and the NITC element all-source substantive intelligence support to include direct dissemination of incoming message traffic and hard copy reporting, consultative access to desk level analysts, intelligence collection specialists and watch personnel and direct access to data bases and automated data systems available to the NMIC. This support will be expanded, as required, meet the requirements of the DCI and an augmented NITC element during periods of active crisis management.

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7. The NITO and members of the NITC element's permanent staff will be authorized direct access to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) for the purpose of conducting liaison necessary to effective coordination of intelligence collection operations relating to warning and crisis management situations.

Good -- 8. The Joint Staff will provide the DCI timely advice concerning operations under consideration regarding alerting, movement or engagement of U.S. forces in connection with incipient and active international crisis situations in order to permit appropriate adjustment of intelligence operations and support. Normally, the DCI will be advised on the day preceding a scheduled SCC meeting of operational courses of action under consideration for submission to the SCC and given timely notification of changes made in the interim. The DCI will accord this information the same level of security protection as that assigned within the Department of Defense.

OPERATING FACILITIES

9. The Department of Defense will make available for use by the NITC enclosed working (office) space of approximately 800 contiguous square feet within the NMIC and adjacent to the CCF, to include an office suitable for the DCI's personal use during crisis management situations. DoD will provide, on a reimbursable basis, technical and support services necessary to installation and maintenance of equipment and other furnishings required for NITC element operations and direct support to the DCI.

10. In addition, DoD will provide supplementary working space on a temporary basis when required for augmentation of the NITC element by the DCI during periods of expanded operations resulting from increased international tensions and active crisis management. Such space will accommodate up to five people and will be located in the immediate vicinity of the CCF and permanent NITC element spaces. Joint use with a DIA task force focused on the same operational context will meet this requirement. DCI personnel serving as crisis augmentees will be provided the same support services and facilities during their tenure as the permanent NITC element staff.

*INFAC liaison
could be
included in
this category*

11. DoD will provide the NITC element, on a reimbursable basis, consumable supplies and services necessary to the conduct of day-to-day operations.

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

12. Working spaces provided the NITC will be equipped with telephone lines and instruments sufficient to insure efficient communications. Non-secure telephone lines will provide access to AUTOVON; secure telephone lines to the NSA gray system and AUTOSEVOCOM. A ring-down extension to the NMIC NOIWON terminal will be installed.

13. The NMIC Support System will be employed as the primary means for disseminating substantive intelligence and relevant operational and administrative message traffic to the NITC element. Three UNIVAC 1652 terminals and a printer will be installed by DIA in the NITC element working spaces and provided the same operating capabilities as similar terminals installed elsewhere in NMIC, including INDICOM access.

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14. The record communications facility serving DIA will provide message center services for incoming and outgoing messages addressed to and originated by the NITC element (NITO). The DCI will establish a discrete telecommunications routing indicator for this purpose.

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5 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Our fundamental objection to [] draft agreement is that it sets out to accomplish precisely what we have urged be avoided. During crises it places the Director in a position where he is physically separated from his analytical and operational base and is dependent on non-Agency communications for the delivery of CIA staff reports and Agency-generated finished intelligence. The arrangements [] proposes would isolate the Director from the Intelligence Community. NITC talks to CCF and to itself that much is clear. Less certain is whether NITC talks to any intelligence producer other than DIA. What about the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, for example? Does [] intend to accommodate the Secretary of State too?

2. While the draft agreement pays lip service to the notion of shifting operations elsewhere in the community when appropriate (given bureaucratic inertia that's unlikely), it would bind the DCI to the NMIC/CCF. The scenarios it limns are caste exclusively in worst case military confrontations or near confrontations--situations in which the US military invokes the mantle of the national command authority. It doesn't allow for the statutory participation of the Director.

3. We submit that in assigning himself Crisis Management responsibilities and in citing Executive Order 12036, Section 1-5 as justification for doing so, [] does some harm to the fabric of that Order. We read Section 1-5 to mean the NITC "shall be the central mechanism" by which the DCI translates intelligence requirements into specific collection objectives and tasks collection organizations and systems for the purpose of obtaining information, which then is disseminated in a timely fashion. Sections 1-501 and 502 do not deal at all with Crisis Management. That is found only by implication in Section 1-504 which clearly relates to a war-time situation in which the DCI relinquishes authority to the Secretary of Defense.

4. Throughout [] draft the emphasis is on DOD communications. DIA is to provide all-source traffic. CIA staff reports are communicated to DOD routinely by electrical means via the Joint Telecommunications Center through use of a special routing indicator. The NITO could receive cable traffic via this Center in normal times. Compartmented traffic, however, whether finished or raw, can be communicated only via NSA and then on to DIA's SSO in the NMCC. The Office of Communications strongly suspects that there is a "choke point" angle to be considered. For its part, OC says it could not pick up the full flow of military traffic were that flow delivered here in the event that NITC was located in Headquarters in the same fashion [] proposes to operate in the Pentagon. OC's sources in the Pentagon tell it that DIA's SSO could handle no more than 50 to 100 additional messages a day with its current configuration.

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K1 5. For valid security reasons the Agency cannot provide the DCI via third party links, DIA or otherwise, back channel or operational messages. According to [redacted] scheme DIA would provide the DCI access to desk level analysts. Whose analysts? How is the NITC element to be expanded? What analyst in CIA or INR will agree to distance himself from his data base. The proposal is naive.

6. What guarantee is there that the military operators for the first time will share with the intelligence community, represented by the NITC, operational plans? They have not done so in the past nor are they obligated to do so by the Executive Order 12036.

7. 800 sq. ft. equates to an office or row of offices roughly 20' by 40'. If that space is occupied by a five-man NITO element, there would be little room left for the DCI--let alone communications equipment, displays, conference room, etc.

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